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Abstract
Laws of nature have various roles in scientific practice. It is widely agreed that an
adequate theory of lawhood ought to align with the roles that scientists assign to
the laws. But philosophers disagree over whether Humean laws or non-Humean laws
are better at filling these roles. In this paper, I provide a new argument for settling
this dispute. I consider (epistemically) possible situations in which scientists re-
ceive conclusive evidence that—according to the non-Humean—falsifies their beliefs
about the laws, but which—according to the Humean—does not falsify their beliefs
about the laws. I argue that, in these possible scenarios, all law-related aspects of
scientific practice would remain unchanged. In other words, scientists would treat
the regularities “preferred” by the Humean as the laws of nature. On this basis, I
conclude that non-Humean laws fail to align with scientific practice.
1 Introduction
Laws of nature have various roles in scientific practice. It is widely agreed that an
adequate theory of lawhood ought to align with the roles that scientists assign to the
laws. But philosophers disagree over whether Humean laws or non-Humean laws are
better at filling these roles.
It would be straightforward to resolve this question if Humeans and non-Humeans
disagreed on which specific regularities count as laws of nature. Then, we could simply
consider which regularities scientists treat as laws to settle the issue. But of course,
Humeans and non-Humeans agree that (e.g.) Schro¨dinger’s Equation is a law; they
disagree over what makes it so.
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But while Humeans and non-Humeans agree on which regularities actually count
as laws, there are (epistemically) possible scenarios in which they disagree on which
regularities count as laws. Now, imagine that scientists were to discover that such
a scenario obtained. This would provide a “test case” for deciding the debate over
Humeanism. By seeing which regularities scientists treat as laws in these cases—those
predicted by the Humean vs. those predicted by the non-Humean—we would have clear
evidence regarding whether Humean laws or non-Humean laws better align with scientific
practice.
In this paper, I develop a version of this strategy to challenge non-Humeanism. The
argument appeals to certain (epistemically) possible “Humean Do¨ppelgangers” of the
actual world: worlds that agree with the actual world on the Humean base, but which
(according to the non-Humean) have different laws. Humeans and non-Humeans disagree
on which regularities count as laws in these Do¨ppelgangers; Humeans will say that the
laws are what we ordinarily take them to be, while non-Humeans will say that the laws
are different.
My argument considers (epistemically) possible situations in which scientists receive
conclusive evidence that such a Do¨ppelganger scenario obtains. In other words, they
receive evidence that—according to the non-Humean—falsifies their judgments about
the laws, but which—according to the Humean—does not falsify their judgments about
the laws. I argue that, in these possible scenarios, all law-related aspects of scientific
practice would remain unchanged. In other words, scientists would treat the regularities
“preferred” by the Humean as the laws. On this basis, I conclude that non-Humean laws
fail to align with scientific practice.
2 Background
After some brief background in this section, I present the argument against the
non-Humean in sections 3-4. In section 5, I conclude the paper by sketching how the
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argument can also be used to deflect some common objections to Humeanism.
2.1 Laws in scientific practice
I will begin by reviewing the roles of laws in scientific contexts. Here, we can view
scientific contexts as contexts where (i) our ultimate evidence is from observations and
empirical measurements and (ii) reasoning involves inductive, abductive, and statistical
inferences from that evidence (Roberts (2008, 264)).
(1) Fixed points in counterfactual reasoning : Lange (2000, ch. 2) and Roberts (2008,
chs. 5-7) observe that laws are held fixed in scientific counterfactual reasoning in ways
that mere regularities are not. More precisely, Lange and Roberts defend the principle
of Nomological Preservation (NP)1:
NP: ∀Q∀P (if Q is consistent with the lawhood of all and only the actual laws
of nature, and the lawhood of all and only the actual laws of nature logically
entails P , then: if Q had been the case, then P would still have been the
case)
Roberts (2008, 273-291) argues that, in order to recognize something as an observation
or measurement, one must assume the truth of the counterfactual conditionals described
by NP. This is because we cannot distinguish conditions under which a measurement
procedure is reliable without holding laws fixed in counterfactual reasoning.
(2) Supporting induction: Laws also have a special role in scientific inductive rea-
soning. Says Lange (2000, 21): “we can regard the observed instance as confirming the
hypothesis “inductively” ... only if we believe that the hypothesis may state a law.”2
Lange offers this example: because it would be a mere coincidence that all coins received
as change today are pennies, we do not regard receiving a penny as change as evidence
that the next received coin will be a penny. By contrast, because we think that it fol-
lows (or may follow) from the laws, the hypothesis that all samples of a compound boil
1This formulation is from Roberts (2008, 191). Lange (2000, 53) calls his formulation Λ-preservation.
2Lange (2000, 143-156) adjusts this characterization to avoid counterexamples, but I will set these
details aside.
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at temperature C is thought to be inductively confirmed by an observation of a given
sample of that compound boiling at C.
(3) Laws and explanation: Scientists use laws to explain the facts subsumed under
them. For example, suppose an electron curves in a magnetic field. Scientists explain
this trajectory by appealing to the Lorentz force law, which states that a particle of
charge q with a velocity v in an electric field E and a magnetic field B experiences a
force of F = qE + qv ×B. By contrast, the mere coincidence that all coins received as
change today were pennies does not explain the fact that the third coin thus received
was a penny.3
(4) Foundation of important scientific distinctions: Scientists appeal to laws, but
not other regularities, in order to determine what is possible. Maudlin (2007, 7-8) offers
this example: because a closed universe and an open universe are both consistent with
Einstein’s gravitational law, physicists believe that both types of universe are possible.
Roberts (2012, 12ff) provides a second example: we use statistical thermodynamics
to explain why a glass of ice water will contain no solid ice after sitting outside on
a hot day for five minutes. The explanation is, roughly, that the set of possible initial
states of the water molecules that would lead to solid ice after five minutes is vanishingly
small within the space of all possible initial states. But to make sense of notions like
“vanishingly small” in this context, we need to justify a choice of measure over the states
of the system. This measure, in turn, requires the distinction between the dynamically
possible vs. merely logically possible trajectories of a system of particles through phase
3It is sometimes claimed that, in addition to explaining their instances, laws explain regularities as a
whole. This is plausible for accidental regularities and for regularities corresponding to non-fundamental
laws. For example, Kepler’s laws can be derived from (and explained by) Newton’s laws plus assumptions
about initial conditions (see, e.g., Fowler (2002)). Both Humeans and non-Humeans accept that laws
explain these kinds of regularities.
As for the regularities corresponding to the fundamental laws themselves: this is less obvious. While
non-Humeans share this intuition, it is not clear that scientists use the laws this way. For example, when
reading a physics textbook, one does not typically read anything about what explains the regularity
corresponding to Schro¨dinger’s Equation. So for simplicity, I will follow the recent literature by focusing
on the role of laws in explaining their instances. This will not affect the discussion ahead. (And at any
rate, Dorst (2019, fn. 3) and Hicks (ms) argue that Humeans laws are capable of explaining (fundamental)
regularities as a whole. So this is unlikely to be a deciding factor in the dispute over Humeanism.)
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space.
(5) Objects of scientific discovery : Finally, laws are objects of scientific discovery.
Scientists do not merely investigate particular facts; from these particular facts, they
seek to infer claims about general laws.4
2.2 Humean Supervenience
What must the laws be like if they are to fill the roles required of them by scientists?
One central disagreement is over whether Humean laws or non-Humean laws are better
able to perform these various types of scientific work. Humeans and non-Humeans
disagree over the following thesis5:
Humean Supervenience about Laws (HS): no two possible worlds differ
on what is a law of nature unless they also differ on their Humean bases.
Intuitively, the Humean base will include particular facts about the existence of physical
objects, their (non-dispositional) physical properties, and their spatiotemporal relations
to one another. It will exclude facts that involve laws of nature, causation, counterfac-
tuals, or dispositions. This intuitive characterization of the Humean base will suffice for
the discussion ahead.
One corollary of the denial of HS is the claim that the actual world has Humean
Do¨ppelgangers: worlds that share the actual world’s Humean base but which have dif-
ferent laws.6 For example, Armstrong (1983, 71-72) argues that any true universal
regularity (among instances of universals) entailed by the Humean base in the actual
world could either be a law or fail to be a law. Similarly, Lange (2000, 51) says:
4See Lange (2000, 2.4) for discussion.
5See, e.g., Carroll (1994, 58) and Loewer (1996).
6Strictly speaking, the denial of HS does not entail that there are actual-world Do¨ppelgangers. One
might say, for example, that some possible worlds share a Humean base while having different laws, even
though the actual world is not among them. But see Earman & Roberts (2005, 263) for discussionof
why this stance would be implausible.
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That two possible worlds could have exactly the same non-nomic facts, but
differ in which non-nomic facts state laws, should not really be surprising,
considering that the laws in a given world are tied up not just with what in
fact comes to pass there, but also with what would have happened there had
certain circumstances unrealized in that world instead come to pass there.
2.3 The formalized argument
As mentioned in the introduction, these (alleged) Do¨ppelgangers of the actual world
can serve as “test cases”: cases that help decide whether Humean laws or non-Humean
laws better align with scientific practice. Here is the intuitive idea. Let’s suppose that
scientists were to receive (near-enough) conclusive evidence that—according to the non-
Humean—showed that we actually live in such a Do¨ppelganger. In other words, suppose
that scientists were to receive conclusive evidence that—according to the non-Humean—
reveals their judgments about the laws (though not their judgments about the Humean
base) to be false.7
If scientists track non-Humean laws, then receiving this evidence should have a dra-
matic effect on scientific practice. Scientists would be learning that they were completely
wong about the laws, and so we would expect this discovery to affect many areas of sci-
entific practice. But I will argue that this non-Humean “prediction” is not borne out.
This, in turn, is evidence that scientific practice does not, in fact, track non-Humean
laws. Here is the formal argument:
Argument:
Let E be (near-enough) conclusive evidence that—according to the non-
Humean—reveals scientists’ judgments about the laws (though not their
judgments about the Humean base) to be false.
Premise 1: If scientists were to receive E, this would not alter those aspects
of scientific practice relating to the laws.
7As I will discuss in 3.2, the descriptions of the evidence in last two sentences are not quite equivalent.
I will use the latter description when speaking precisely, but the former is useful for intuitive purposes.
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Premise 2: If scientists would not alter those aspects of scientific practice
relating to laws upon receiving E, then non-Humean laws do not fill the roles
that laws have in scientific practice.
—————–
Conclusion: non-Humean laws do not fill the roles that laws have in scien-
tific practice.
I will defend the argument’s two premises in the next two sections.
3 Defending premise 1
In this section, I will consider two thought experiments in which scientists receive
evidence E that—according to the non-Humean—reveals their judgments about the
laws (though not their judgments about the Humean base) to be false. I will argue that
receiving such evidence would not alter the “law-related” aspects of scientific practice.
3.1 Preliminaries
Here are some preliminary notes:
(a) The Oracle: To simplify discussion, I will suppose that E is (near-enough) con-
clusive evidence. To illustrate this, I will suppose that (in each case) scientists receive
E as testimony from an all-knowing, completely trustworthy Oracle.
Of course, the appeal to an Oracle is fanciful, but it does no essential work in the
argument ahead. Ultimately, it does not matter how scientists end up accepting E. If
one prefers, one can instead suppose that scientists accept E because they hear some
persuasive philosophical argument for E.
(b) Scientific contexts: We can distinguish scientists’ reactions to the Oracle’s tes-
timony immediately after receiving it from their responses upon returning to scientific
work. I will now explain why only the latter responses are relevant to this paper.
My argument focuses on how laws are used in scientific practice. For this reason,
we need to consider how laws are used in the typical contexts of scientific work: con-
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texts where scientists are engaged in inductive reasoning from evidence obtained through
observation and measurement. But the context immediately following the Oracle’s tes-
timony is not a typical scientific context. For this reason, scientists’ immediate response
to the Oracle is less relevant than how this testimony ultimately influences their work.
Focusing on “long term” responses also helps avoid some obvious complications with
immediate reactions. To assess the latter would require a poll. And we have no reason
to expect that scientists would respond to such a poll in any uniform way. After all,
the norms governing how scientists use laws in their everyday work may not hold in the
immediate aftermath of the Oracle’s testimony. But for long-term reactions, no polls
are needed. This is because we know a lot about the roles of laws in scientific practice
(see 2.1). By reflecting on these roles, we can make confident predictions about how
scientists would respond upon returning to scientific work (I will discuss this point in
greater detail in 3.4.)
One might worry that long-term reactions encounter their own difficulties: scientists
may simply have forgotten, stopped caring, or changed their mind about the Oracle’s
testimony. In fact, I agree that these factors may affect scientists’ long-term reactions.
But as I discuss in 3.4, these possibilities actually support my ultimate interpretation of
the cases. Another worry with long-term reactions is that scientific practice may change
in light of the Oracle’s testimony. I discuss this possibility in 4.2.
(c) Theological descriptions: Few scientists are familiar with the terminology philoso-
phers use when discussing HS. But if scientists do not understand the Oracle’s testimony,
their responses will tell us little about scientific practice. To finesse this issue, I will in-
voke the conceit of a divine lawgiver. We can imagine God performing two tasks when
creating the world. First, God assigns initial conditions to the particles. Second, God is-
sues a set of decrees (e.g., “Let it be the case that f = ma.”) that the particles therefore
must obey throughout history. Of course, most non-Humeans do not actually appeal to
a divine lawmaker. But non-Humeans should allow that, in an (epistemically) possible
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world where there is a God issuing decrees, the laws supervene on those decrees.
Most people have an intuitive grip on the idea of a divine lawmaker. Indeed, this
is why non-Humeans sometimes appeal to this idea when intuitively motivating the
“governing” conception of laws.8 So by appealing to a divine lawgiver, we can set aside
worries about whether scientists understand the Oracle.
3.2 Case 1: The Humean world
Suppose that scientists visit the all-knowing, perfectly-trustworthy Oracle. There,
they hear the following speech:
“At the fundamental level, there is a vast mosaic of particular matters of
fact, and that is all. But there is nothing over and above the mosaic that
governs these particular matters of fact. For example, it is not as if God
issued a command that particles follow in any given pattern.”
According to the non-Humean, the above testimony establishes that we live in a world
with no laws. So if scientists are tracking non-Humean laws, we should expect this
revelation to have a dramatic effect on scientific practice. But would it? To assess this
question, I will consider the various specific roles that laws have within scientific practice
(see 2.1).
(N.b.: As I stipulate the example, the Humean world is a Do¨ppelganger in the
sense described in 2.2. But note that the Oracle says nothing specific about what
the mosaic is like; she only says that nothing governs it. Insofar as this testimony
leaves open what might happen in the future, it technically does not establish that we
live in a Do¨ppelganger. But it does provide conclusive evidence that—according to the
non-Humean—reveals scientists’ law judgments (though not their judgments about the
Humean base) to be false. This is all that is required for my formal argument (see 2.3).
This point only becomes relevant when discussing the inductive role of laws—see (iii)
8See Carroll (1994, 17-18) and Lange (2000, 51). See also Beebee (2000, 580-581) and Loewer (1996,
115) for discussion from a Humean perspective.
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below.)
(i) Counterfactual reasoning : According to the non-Humean, the Oracle’s testimony
implies that there are no (interesting) true counterfactuals (for there are no laws to
support to them). So if scientists track non-Humean laws, we should expect them to
stop relying on counterfactual reasoning upon receiving the Oracle’s testimony. Perhaps
we can imagine certain scientists doing exactly this in the moments immediately following
the testimony. They might say things like “There is no fact of the matter about how
this particle would curve if we increased this magnetic field” or “Who knows what would
happen to these binary stars if the mass of one of them increased by half?”
But, upon reflection, it is difficult to believe that any scientist could or would persist
in this attitude upon returning to actual scientific work. For example, imagine students
in a physics lab asking questions like “But what would happen if we increased the
magnetic field?” and “What would happen if we coupled the pendula together?” And
to each question, the TA replies: “Who can say?” (or else: “We cannot make sense of
that question.”). Or imagine students writing “There is no fact of the matter” every
time their homework asked about what would happen if the projectile was fired at a
different angle or if the spring was stretched twice as far. This would be useless.
Similarly, Roberts (2008, 273-291) argues that it would be impossible for scientists
to distinguish the conditions under which a measurement procedure is reliable without
holding laws fixed in counterfactual reasoning. So without counterfactual reasoning,
scientists would have no grounds for relying on measurements.
The broader point is that many scientific projects would be undermined without
counterfactual reasoning. But scientists would not stop pursuing these projects (in the
successful way that they did before) simply because they learned that the world lacked
non-Humean structure. (For now, I hope the reader finds this last claim intuitive. But
I will return to this point in 3.4, where I will provide specific reasons for thinking that
scientists would continue pursuing these projects using counterfactual reasoning).
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One might worry that this begs the question against the non-Humean, who says that
there are no (interesting) true counterfactuals in the case described. But at present,
I make no claims about which counterfactuals (if any) are actually true. I only claim
that post-Oracle scientists would continue reasoning counterfactually so that they could
continue pursuing their projects in the effective way they did before.
There is probably an even more basic reason why scientists would continue reason-
ing counterfactually: it is almost certainly psychologically impossible for normal adult
human subjects to fail to engage in counterfactual reasoning. There is a large psycho-
logical literature on the prevalence of counterfactual reasoning and its importance to
deliberation and behavior regulation.9 I will return to this point in 3.4.
(ii) Laws and explanation: According to the non-Humean, the Oracle’s testimony
implies that particular physical facts cannot be explained using laws (for there are no
laws). So, then, we should expect scientists to stop giving informative explanations
of particular physical facts. And, perhaps, this is what certain scientists would do
immediately after the testimony. They might say “There is no explanation of why the
electron curved when we increased the magnetic field.”
But again, there is no chance that scientists would persist in this attitude once
returned to everyday work. Imagine, for example, a physics lab where the students are
asking questions like “Why did the electron curve so much more that time?” and “Why
did the electron curve up instead of down that time?” And imagine the TA responds,
in each case: “There is no explanation for this.” This would be pedagogically useless;
it would be very difficult (if not impossible) to teach physics by providing the same
uninformative answer any time someone asks for an explanation.10
The non-Humean might suggest that post-Oracle scientists would adjust their ap-
9 See, e.g., Stalnaker (1996), Gilovich, et al (2003), Epstude & Rose (2008), Summerville & Roese
(2008).
10The non-Humean might say that, even if it is pedagogically useless, telling the students that there
are no explanations is useful for another reason: it conveys an important fact about the world revealed
to the Oracle. (I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.) I address this objection below in fn.
12.
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proach to teaching by replacing explanatory questions with something else. But I submit
that scientists would not radically alter their pedagogy simply because of the Oracle’s
testimony. (For now, I hope this claim seems intuitive, but I provide four arguments for
it in 3.4 and 3.5.)
All of this may seem to beg the question against the non-Humean, who says that
physical facts have no explanation in the described possibility. But, again, I only claim
that scientists would, as a matter of fact, continue offering the same kinds of explanations
they did before.
Just as before, we might appeal to facts about human psychology as well. It is a part
of our psychological makeup to make explanatory inferences. Could scientists perma-
nently “choose” to believe that there is no explanation for why the electron happened
to curve the way it did? I will return to this point in 3.4.
(iii) Inductive reasoning : As discussed in 2.1, scientists require the distinction be-
tween laws and merely accidentally true regularities in order to distinguish legitimate
inductive inferences from illegitimate ones (recall the example comparing the case of
boiling points to the case of coins received as change). According to the non-Humean,
the Oracle’s testimony implies that scientists can no longer draw this distinction. So if
scientists are tracking non-Humean laws, the Oracle’s testimony should undermine the
inductive practices of scientists.
But this would certainly never happen. Making predictions is an invaluable scientific
project, and scientists would not stop pursuing this project simply because they learned
that the world lacked non-Humean structure. In addition, it is almost certain that we are
psychologically incapable of foregoing our inductive practices in the way that would be
required (in this case) if scientists tracked non-Humean laws. For example, suppose we
hold fixed our total evidence about the past. It is doubtful that we are psychologically
capable of failing to draw any distinction between regularities that are confirmed by
their instances and those that are not.
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(iv) Important scientific distinctions: As discussed in 2.1, thermodynamics requires
a distinction between the dynamically possible vs. logically possible trajectories of a
system through phase space. If the non-Humean is correct, then the Oracle’s testimony
implies that there is no such meaningful distinction. So if post-Oracle scientists tracked
non-Humean laws, they could no longer use thermodynamics to give explanations or
make predictions. But scientists would not stop studying thermodynamics just because
of what they learned from the Oracle. I clarify exactly why this is difficult to imagine
in 3.4.11
(v) Objects of scientific discovery : Perhaps, after the Oracle’s testimony, we can
imagine certain scientists succumbing to defeatist attitudes: “Why bother using the
particle accelerator? After all, there are no laws to discover anyway.” But, again, this
attitude would not persist. The search for lawful regularities is itself a foundational
scientific project, and scientists would not stop pursuing this project simply because
they learned that the world lacked non-Humean structure.
3.3 Case 2: The fragile world
Here is a second case. In this example, let D0, Dr1 , ... be the total momentary
physical states of our universe at times t = 0, t = r1, ..., and let {D0, Dr1 , ...} be the
total set of such states across all times t. The Oracle declares:
“At the beginning of time, God assigned the universe initial state D0. Since
that time, the universe has always conformed to Newton’s equations. But this
is not because God decreed that F = ma, that FG =
Gm1m2
d21,2
, etc. Instead, it
is because God issued the following conditional decree:
-if the universe is in one of the states from the set
{
D0, Dr1 , Dr2 , ...
}
,
11On the other hand, Humeans seem to accept a different range of nomically possible worlds than do
non-Humeans. So, if scientists were to learn that the world was Humean, wouldn’t this require changes
in how scientists treat nomic possibility? I consider this objection in 3.6.
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-else: all matter annihilates.”
According to the non-Humean, the above testimony establishes that we are in a Do¨ppelganger.
Rather than there being no laws at all (as in 3.2), this is a case where the laws are dif-
ferent from what we suppose; specifically: the laws take the conditional form described
by the Oracle.
How would this testimony affect law-related aspects of scientific practice? For some
of these roles, the non-Humean predicts no difference. For example, the non-Humean
will not expect this testimony to affect inductive reasoning. But for two of the roles, the
non-Humean predicts dramatic differences.
(i) Counterfactual reasoning : The non-Humean will say that this is a world where, if
the universe were to enter any state other than one of its actual states, all matter would
annihilate. And perhaps, immediately after the Oracle’s testimony, we can imagine
certain scientists exclaiming: “So if the weight had been released, it would not have
fallen. Instead, all matter would have annihilated!”
But even these scientists would soon return to reasoning counterfactually as they
had before. To see why, this time imagine a physics TA replying “The world would
annihilate” in response to every question about what would happen if the magnetic field
were adjusted. Or imagine a student writing “The world would annihilate” any time
their homework asked them what would happen if the magnetic field had been stronger.
This would be ridiculous. (Just as in 3.2, I make no claims (at present) about which
counterfactuals are true. I only make a claim about scientists’ long-term reactions to
the Oracle’s testimony.)
Why exactly would this be ridiculous, if in fact the world is fragile in this way?
In response: it would be next to impossible to teach physics if students received the
same, trivial answer anytime they asked their TA this sort of question during their lab
section. And imagine how little understanding a student would get from a homework set
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if they wrote the same, trivial answer every time they were asked what would happen
were conditions different. (Indeed, almost any standard physics homework problem
would become completely intractable. Instead of using the traditional equations to
calculate what would happen under certain described conditions, students would have
to do exhaustive empirical investigations to figure out whether the conditions described
in the problem ever have or ever will obtain. Of course, this would be impossible, and
no student could ever learn physics this way.)
The absurdity of using the divine decrees to evaluate counterfactuals would arise in
any context where scientists engage in counterfactual reasoning. To modify an example
from Dorst (forthcoming), suppose a physicist is called as an expert witness in a case
involving a car wreck. Imagine that, when asked what would have happened if the driver
had braked earlier, the physicist responds: “The world would have annihilated.” When
asked what would have happened if the roads were dry (or if the tires were different, or
. . . ), imagine the physicist always giving the same response.
These examples show how evaluating every counterfactual in the same, trivial way
each time would be as useless as not reasoning counterfactually at all. But without
(non-trivial) counterfactual reasoning, many important scientific projects (such as tak-
ing measurements, teaching science, and even giving expert testimony) would suffer.
And scientists would never let the Oracle’s testimony impede these important scientific
projects. They would not, for example, dramatically revise the homework sets assigned
to their students. (I leave this point intuitive for now, but will defend it at length in
3.4.)
Again, one might worry that this begs the question against the non-Humean, who
says that, in the fragile world in question, all counterfactuals ought to be evaluated in
the same, trivial way. But at present, I make no claims about which counterfactuals
(if any) are actually true. I only claim that scientists would continuing pursuing their
projects (including the teaching of science) after the Oracle’s testimony, which would
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require them to reason counterfactually as they did before.
(ii) Important scientific distinctions: The non-Humean will say that, given the Or-
acle’s testimony, the only dynamically possible trajectory of a system is its actual tra-
jectory. But then there can be no interesting measure defined over the states of the
system’s phase space, and so there can be no thermodynamical explanations. So if sci-
entists track non-Humean laws, they would have to stop relying on thermodynamics
when giving explanations and making predictions. But I suggest that this would never
happen. I clarify the reasons why below.
3.4 How can we know how scientists would respond?
Once one has seen the basic form of the thought experiments, it is easy to generate
additional examples. These cases support premise 1 (see 2.3):
Premise 1: If scientists were to receive E, this would not alter those aspects
of scientific practice relating to laws of nature.
But the non-Humean might reply: how can I be so confident that scientific practice would
go on as before? Maybe it would, but then again maybe it wouldn’t. Isn’t this just a
sociological question? To address this concern, I will now distinguish three independent
arguments for thinking that scientific practice would not change.
(I) Indifference: The most basic reason why the Oracle’s testimony would not alter
scientific practice is the fact that, throughout the course of their everyday work, scientists
are completely indifferent to the debate over Humeanism. For example, when in the lab,
scientists never pause to consider the possibility that we might be in some Do¨ppelganger
scenario (or how we might rule out such a possibility). They do not, for example, go
around wondering whether Schro¨dinger’s Equation really is a law of nature (unless, of
course, there is concern that Schro¨dinger’s Equation fails to truly describe the Humean
base).
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In 3.1, I considered the possibility that scientists’ long-term reactions are explained
by their forgetting or ceasing to care about the Oracle’s testimony. In fact, I agree that
these factors may affect scientist’s long term reactions. But the reason we can easily
imagine scientists forgetting or ceasing to care about the Oracle is because scientists are
typically indifferent (in the course of their everyday work) to what might or might not
exist over and above the mosaic.
Suppose it is true that, in their everyday work, scientists are indifferent to what
might be “behind the scenes” of the Humean mosaic. Then it is implausible to think
that scientists would alter scientific practice upon receiving the Oracle’s testimony. To
alter their scientific practice, scientists would have to deeply care about the metaphysical
underpinnings of the laws. But in reality, thoughts about what is “behind the mosaic”
rarely, if ever, cross their mind.12
(II) Psychological necessity : Next, I turn to a consideration alluded to throughout
3.2: that it would psychologically impossible for scientists to alter their practice in the
way that would be necessary if they tracked non-Humean laws. For example, I have
suggested that it is psychologically impossible for adult humans to (permanently) forego
reasoning counterfactually at all (as in the Humean world) or to (permanently) rely on
world-annhilation counterfactuals (as in the fragile world).
To be clear, I am not denying that we can, at any given moment, evaluate counter-
factuals in the way that the non-Humean thinks is appropriate. Instead, I am claiming
that it would be psychologically impossible, in these cases, to go about the business
of our everyday lives while continuing to reason counterfactually “in the non-Humean
way.” This is no speculative psychological hypothesis: simply try to plan the rest of
12The present discussion also helps address the objection from fn. 10: that post-Oracle scientists would
start saying “There are no explanations” because (according to the non-Humean) this is an important
metaphysical fact about the world. While philosophers are interested in whether there is something
“behind the scenes” governing the trajectories of electrons, this kind of fact is not important to scientists
in their everyday work. After all, scientists rarely (if ever) think about the debate over Humeanism.
(If the reader is not convinced, I note that both (II) and (III) also tell against the suggestion that
post-Oracle scientists would stop giving informative explanations.)
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your day, or write a philosophy paper, without relying on counterfactual reasoning.13
This point applies to all adult humans and so to scientists in particular. Even if they
tried (in these cases) to reason counterfactually in the way that the non-Humean thinks
appropriate, they would not be able to do so—at least not for very long.
This kind of argument may not apply to every one of the roles considered in 3.2
and 3.3. But I think that something similar applies with inductive reasoning (in the
Humean world): I doubt that we are psychologically capable of failing to draw any
distinction between regularities that are confirmed by their instances and those that
are not (assuming our total evidence about the past is held fixed). The same goes for
explanatory reasoning as well: we are not psychologically capable of going about our
everyday lives while continuing to view everything as lacking an explanation.
(III) Continuing the successful pursuit of scientific projects: I have presented cases
where, according to the non-Humean, either the laws do not exist (cf. the Humean world)
or the laws are “useless” for the roles they are supposed to have in scientific practice (cf.
the fragile world). Throughout 3.2-3.3, I argued that various scientific projects would
(at the very least) be adversely affected were scientists tracking non-Humean laws in
these cases.
Here were some of the examples: if scientists evaluated counterfactuals in the “non-
Humean way” it would harm projects such as teaching physics, taking measurements, and
giving expert testimony. The teaching project would also suffer if (as the non-Humean
predicts) scientists in the Humean world stopped asking explanatory questions. Without
distinguishing inductively-supported generalizations from those not so supported (in
the Humean world), the project of making predictions would be impossible. Failing to
distinguish dynamically from logically possible trajectories through phase space would
undermine the study of thermodynamics. This merely scratches the surface: without
anything suitable to fill roles (i)-(v), many other projects—e.g., manipulating nature,
13And, at any rate, there is extensive empirical support for the prevalence of counterfactual reasoning
and its importance to deliberation, planning, and behavior regulation—see, e.g., fn. 9.
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designing new technologies, unifying physical phenomena, etc.—would suffer (and may
not even be possible at all).14
The non-Humean may say that, as disappointing as all of that would be, post-Oracle
scientists would just have to temper their expectations and ambitions.15 But even the
non-Humean must acknowledge that, in the specific scenarios in question, scientists
could pursue their projects just as successfully as they did before. This is because both
scenarios are Do¨ppelgangers16 of the actual world throughout their entire history. So, for
example, these scenarios agree with the actual world on every observable matter of fact.17
From this we know that scientists in these scenarios manifestly have been successful at
making predictions, teaching physics, manipulating nature, etc.; indeed, they have been
exactly as successful as scientists in the actual world. And because these scenarios are
Do¨ppelgangers of the actual world throughout their entire history, we also know that
post-Oracle scientists would continue to be just as successful at making predictions,
manipulating nature, and so on (were they to attempt to do so).
(Insofar as they deny that Humean laws are robustly explanatory, non-Humeans will
deny this point when it comes to projects involving explanation. As I discuss in 3.6,
Humeans will disagree. But at present, we can set aside the question of whether Humean
laws are as robustly explanatory as primitive laws are supposed to be. This is because
it is clear that there are, at the very least, certain specific explanatory projects that
would remain viable after the Oracle. For example, Bhogal (forthcoming) discusses how
scientists use laws to unify physical phenomena. Even the non-Humean must acknowl-
edge that, because the test cases are Do¨ppelgangers, post-Oracle scientists could pursue
14I discuss the unification case shortly hereafter.
15I thank an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
16One caveat: since these scenarios contain Oracle testimony, they do not share quite the same Humean
base as the actual world (which does not contain such testimony). But this technicality can be set aside.
What is important for the current argument is that, throughout their entire history, these scenarios





17With one irrelevant exception—see previous footnote.
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this project just as successfully as before. Since post-Oracle scientists would be able to
continue successfully pursuing projects such as this, they would do so. But this would
require scientists to continue using laws in explanations.18)
In summary: each of the roles (i)-(v) is important for some central scientific project(s)
or other. So if scientists stopped using laws in a certain role, the corresponding project(s)
would (at the very least) be adversely affected. But in fact, these projects could be
accomplished just as successfully in the test cases as in the actual world (since the test
cases are perfect Do¨ppelgangers). So, given the value of these projects, scientists would
continue pursuing them (in the optimal way). And so they would continue using laws
in each of the roles (i)-(v).
3.5 Objection 1: altering scientific practice?
I have argued that scientists would not let the Oracle’s testimony impede their valu-
able projects. But might the testimony still alter scientific practice such that scientists
would pursue these projects differently? For example, I earlier discussed how the ex-
planatory role of laws is important to projects like teaching physics (see 3.2). But
perhaps scientists could successfully accomplish this and other projects by “replacing”
their explanatory questions with something else.19
It is worth emphasizing that both the indifference argument and the psychological
necessity argument (see (I) and (II) from 3.4) directly tell against the proposal that
scientists would alter their practice in this way. However, the present suggestion would
undermine argument (III). So I will now provide two responses.
(IIIa) The unavailability of “replacement” practices. Let’s suppose that post-Oracle
TAs in the Humean world no longer ask (or give informative answers to) explanatory
18The non-Humean may reply that, even so, post-Oracle scientists could not accomplish the project of
giving “governing explanations”: the kinds of explanations that primitive laws are supposed to provide
(see 3.1). But it is doubtful that this is a genuine scientific project, given that scientists are typi-
cally indifferent to the debate over Humeanism. See Bhogal (forthcoming) for further discussion of the
distinction between metaphysical explanations and the nomothetic explanations given by scientists.
19I thank an anonymous referee for this objection.
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questions like “Why did the electron curve?” If they are to still help their students,
what might they ask instead? We might imagine them asking about prediction: “Why
should we have expected the electron to curve?” The problem with this suggestion is
that—according to the non-Humean—the Oracle’s testimony also undermines scientists’
inductive practices (see role (iii) of 3.2). So predictive questions are not available to
the non-Humean scientist as a replacement; insofar as post-Oracle scientists ask such
questions, this is direct evidence against the non-Humean.
Of course, one can also imagine the TA asking counterfactual questions (e.g., “What
would the electron do if the field was increased?”) or questions about what is nomically
possible (e.g., “Would it be possible for the electron to curve along such-and-such trajec-
tory?”). But according to the non-Humean, these other law-related aspects of scientific
practice are also undermined by the Oracle (see 3.2). So these options are not available
to replace explanatory questions either.
Could there be other nearby questions available to the TA? This is difficult to imagine
because, with roles (i)-(v) in 3.2, I already addressed all of (what are typically regarded
to be) the important roles of laws in scientific practice. If there is some other useful
nearby question, it would have to involve some new role for lawlike regularities (which
is not itself undermined by the Oracle). But if there was such a role, we might wonder
why scientists were not already using laws in this capacity. At any rate, it would be the
burden of the objector to defend such a proposal.20
(IIIb): The unsuitability of replacement practices. Let’s set aside the above response
and suppose that the Oracle’s testimony is—by the non-Humean’s lights—compatible
with scientists’ inductive practices. I will argue that, even so, inductive questions would
not be a suitable replacement for explanatory questions.
Let’s grant, for the sake of argument, that TAs could still successfully teach physics
20As an alternative, one might imagine scientists questions such as “Under the fiction that there are
laws, what explains . . . ?” or “Under our changed understanding of laws, what explains . . . .?” In effect,
these questions would allow (non-Humean) scientists to maintain their explanatory practices post-Oracle.
I think these proposals are best understood as an objection to premise 2, so I address them in section 4.
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even after replacing explanatory questions with inductive ones. Even so, there are other
scientific projects that could not be successfully pursued with this (or any other) re-
placement, such as the project of providing unifying explanations. As discussed in 3.4,
post-Oracle scientists would be able to continue successfully pursuing this project (and
therefore would do so). But this, in turn, shows that scientists could not merely replace
the explanatory role of laws with something else.
More generally: perhaps there are some projects that could be accomplished just as
well without using laws in their explanatory capacity. But there are others that could
not. So scientific practice could not be altered in this way without loss. But there is no
need for such loss, given that the test cases are Do¨ppelgangers. So to avoid such loss,
scientists would continue giving informative explanations using laws.
The situation is even worse for the non-Humean when we consider the other roles of
laws. For example, suppose scientists stop making predictions. What could they possibly
do instead that would allow them to accomplish their projects as successfully as before?
They might say “Electrons have done X in this situation every time in the past,” but
this is hardly an appropriate surrogate. Similarly, what could scientists possibly use
as a replacement for counterfactual reasoning? No one has ever found a way “replace”
counterfactual reasoning with reasoning that does not rely on counterfactuals.
3.6 Objection 2: other aspects of scientific practice?
While I have provided several arguments for why scientific practice would not change
after the Oracle’s testimony, one might worry that there is contrary evidence as well. For
example, Humeans and non-Humeans seem to disagree on which situations are nomically
possible (e.g., a world with all the same laws as our own but with only one particle
moving uniformly through space). They also seem to disagree about how to evaluate
nested counterfactuals (e.g., “had there been nothing but a lone electron, then had
there been more electrons than one, the force between any two electrons would have
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accorded with Coulomb’s law”21). They also seem to disagree on whether laws explain
their instances (for how could Humean laws explain particular facts if—according to the
Humean—the mosaic of particular facts explains the laws?). Insofar as scientists talk
about these issues, their practice seems to align with the non-Humean. So this seems to
provide evidence that scientists are tracking non-Humean laws, which in turn is evidence
that scientific practice would change after the Oracle’s testimony.22
In response: I think it is a constraint of adequacy on any theory of lawhood that it
align with scientific practice, including how scientists talk about nested counterfactuals,
nomic possibility, and so on. And it is true that many traditional Humean accounts
have failed this constraint. But recent, more sophisticated versions of Humeanism are
designed to avoid these problems. For example, Roberts (2008, chs. 3, 10) provides
a contextualist treatment of law statements that the Humean can use to account for
how scientists approach nested counterfactuals and nomic possibility.23 Similarly, Loew
& Jaag (forthcoming) provide their own proposal for how the Humean can account for
nested counterfactuals. Loewer (2012), Hicks & van Elswyk (2015), Dorst (2019), and
Hicks (2020) have argued that Humeans laws can (without circularity) explain their
instances.
Of course, the non-Humean may disagree that these recent Humean proposals are
adequate.24 And, regardless, the above proposals are concerned with certain specific
aspects of scientific practice; even if they were all successful, this would not establish
that Humeans can agree with non-Humeans on every aspect of scientific practice.
But establishing this claim is not required for my argument, for two reasons. The
first reason concerns the argument’s place in the overall dialectic. Suppose we grant
that Humeans have not, as of yet, shown that Humean laws fully align with scientific
21See Lange (2009, 54) for this example.
22I thank an anonymous referee for this objection.
23I discuss this account below in section 5.
24For example, see Lange’s (2013) response to one recent attempt to show that Humean laws can
explain their instances.
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practice. Even so, I suspect that many Humeans recognize that this is a burden they
must discharge (hence all of the recent Humean efforts to account for this or that aspect
of scientific practice). And, of course, such Humeans expect that they can ultimately
establish this result. Non-Humeans disagree. But still, we have a kind of stalemate: at
the very least, both Humeans and non-Humeans expect that their account will ultimately
align with scientific practice. One can think of my argument as an attempt to break this
stalemate. By moving to the epistemic possibilities described by the Oracle, we move to
cases where it is agreed on all sides that Humean and non-Humean accounts diverge in
concrete ways. And this is why the Oracle’s pronouncements serve as good “test cases”
(see section 1).
But there is a second, more fundamental point: even if we grant that the Humean
has trouble with (e.g.) nested counterfactuals, the fact remains that the non-Humean
must still address the arguments for Premise 1. In 3.2-3.5, I provided several concrete,
independent arguments for why scientific practice would not change in situations where
the non-Humean predicts that it would change. These arguments did not appeal to any
premises about what existing Humean accounts can or cannot explain; indeed, these
arguments did not mention the Humean at all (aside from the claim that scientists are
indifferent to the debate over Humeanism).25 So the arguments of 3.2-3.5 remain a
challenge to the non-Humean, whatever we end up deciding about the Humean accounts
currently on offer.
4 Defending premise 2
According to the non-Humean, the Oracle’s testimony shows that the laws are very
different than we originally thought. So if scientific practice tracked non-Humean laws,
then we would expect that the Oracle’s testimony to have dramatic effects on scientific
25Not even argument (III)—about the post-Oracle success of scientific projects—made any claims
about what Humean laws can or cannot do. It merely relied on the claim that scientists would be able
to continue successfully pursuing their projects, given that the scenarios in question are exact
Do¨ppelgangers of the actual world.
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practice. But, I have argued, it would not. So, at least prima facie, Premise 1 raises a
problem for the non-Humean.
But there are various ways the non-Humean might explain this result (i.e., explain
how Premise 1 could be true even though scientific practice does, in fact, track non-
Humean laws). For example, one might agree that scientific practice would not alter,
but maintain that scientists would be engaging in fiction or pretense. Or one might claim
that this return would involve a reconceptualization of the aims of scientific practice.
Or one might maintain that this return would be accompanied with a corresponding
rejection of the Oracle’s testimony. In this section, I discuss responses of this kind.
4.1 Fictionalism
I will use the label ‘fictionalism’ to encompass views on which law-related aspects of
scientific practice involve fiction, pretense, or non-literal speech. If scientists are merely
pretending that laws exist, then it is no surprise that scientists continue talking about
laws even after the Oracle.
One problem with this proposal is that there is no independent evidence for fiction-
alism about laws. For example, if someone says “He has a heart of stone” and a child
asks “What type of stone?”, the original speaker will clarify that she was not speaking
literally.26 The same goes for all other clear cases of non-literal or fictional discourse.
But in contrast, scientists have no inclination to retract their law judgments in response
to queries like “Is Schro¨dinger’s Equation really a law?”
The fictionalist might reply that, while scientists do not normally retract their judg-
ments about objects, they might indeed retract them after hearing the Oracle. I agree
that this might happen in certain contexts: those contexts where scientists are specifi-
cally prompted to think about the Oracle. But set these cases aside. Instead, imagine
an “ordinary” scientific context where someone might ask if Schro¨dinger’s Equation is
really a law; imagine, for example, a student who is wondering whether Schro¨dinger’s
26See Burgess & Rosen (1997, 532-534).
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Equation is merely a useful heuristic. In this kind of “ordinary” scientific context—in
other words, a context where scientists are going about their everyday work of investi-
gating and teaching physics—the professors would not retract their judgments (if only
because the debate about Humeanism would not even cross their minds; see the dis-
cussion of scientists’ typical indifference to the debate over Humeanism in 3.4). So, at
minimum, fictionalism is not sufficiently general. More importantly: in 3.1, I explained
why “ordinary scientific contexts” are the ones most relevant to my argument.
A second worry is that fictionalism fails to use the term ‘non-literal’ with its ordinary
meaning. In ordinary use, this expression serves to demarcate judgments of a certain,
clear type: ‘He has a heart of stone’, ‘She was kept in the dark’, etc. So the worry is
that, by viewing all of the judgments in a certain area of discourse as non-literal, the
fictionalist is simply failing to use the distinction between literal and non-literal discourse
in the ordinary way.27
While fictionalism deserves consideration, I think these shortcomings suggest that it
is not an adequate explanation of the Oracle cases.
4.2 Reconceptualization
The second non-Humean explanation of Premise 1 is that the Oracle’s testimony
would trigger a reconceptualization of the scientific project. On this proposal, the non-
Humean grants that scientific practice would “appear the same” after the Oracle’s tes-
timony (in the sense that, e.g., scientists would evaluate counterfactuals as they did
before, etc.). But this, the non-Humean claims, is only because the conceptual founda-
tions of scientific inquriy would change after the Oracle. Originally, scientific practice
aimed at non-Humean laws. But post-Oracle scientific practice would aim at Humean
laws instead. In other words, the term ‘law’ would undergo a semantic shift.
The problem with this proposal is that there is no independent evidence for concep-
tual change. The three major factors thought relevant to reference determination are
27Similar remarks apply to proposals that view law discourse as involving pretense or fiction.
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environment, usage, and speaker’s intentions. A shift in environment explains why, e.g.,
the term ‘water’ shifts reference after spending sufficient time on Twin-Earth. But this
does not apply to the section 3 cases, where we assume that scientists remain in the
same environment.
As for usage: I have argued that the Oracle’s testimony would not affect those aspects
of scientific practice related to the laws of nature. This discussion supports the claim
that the term ‘law’ would have the same inferential role within scientific discourse that
it did before the Oracle’s testimony.28
Might a change in scientists’ semantic intentions indicate conceptual change? One
problem with this proposal is that it is insufficiently general. While we can imagine some
scientists changing their semantic intentions after returning to scientific work, we can
imagine other scientists for whom the thought simply never crosses their mind. Indeed:
scientist’s typical indifference to questions about what might or might not be “behind
the scenes” governing the Humean mosaic (see 3.4) makes this very easy to imagine. So
any change in speakers’ intentions would not be sufficiently general.
But more fundamentally, scientists’ indifference to what might be beyond the Humean
base is itself a reason why the current suggestion fails. It is because scientists are indif-
ferent in this way that all linguistic dispositions (and related semantic intentions) that
actually matter to the use of the term ‘law’ in scientific practice would remain the same
after the Oracle’s testimony. So any alleged change in semantic intentions would be
semantically idle.
To this point, I have argued against there being any semantic shift in the term ‘law’.
But there is a second way to understand the reconceptualization proposal. Consider
how modern physics has changed our understanding of solidity. The discovery that solid
objects do not contain a plenum probably did not (strictly speaking) shift the meaning
28But how could the inferential role remain the same given that Humeans and anti-Humeans disagree
on nested counterfactuals, nomic possibility, and explanation? As discussed in 3.6, recent Humean
accounts are designed to align with what scientists say about these phenomena. I assume, as a working
hypothesis, that the Humean adopts such an account. (See the arguments of 3.6 for further discussion.)
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of the term ‘solid’ (consider, e.g., that we do not view people’s solidity judgments to
be (almost) uniformly false prior to the advent of modern physics). But even so, we
might naturally regard the change in our understanding of solidity as itself a form of
reconceptualization.
Returning to the original case, might a change in scientists’ understanding of the
laws—a change resulting from the Oracle’s testimony—itself explain why post-Oracle
scientific practice does not alter?29 In fact, I think this proposal encounters problems
similar to those discussed above. First, the proposal is insufficiently general. While we
can imagine some scientists changing their theoretical understanding of the metaphysics
of laws due to Oracle’s testimony, we can imagine other scientists for whom there is no
such change. Again, this is especially easy to imagine given that scientists are typically
indifferent to the debate over Humeanism (see 3.4). Indeed, we can be sure that many
scientists (like most non-philosophers) have never considered the question before, and
so have no theoretical views on the metaphysics of laws to begin with. So the current
proposal is insufficiently general.
But just as before, scientists’ typical indifference to the debate over Humeanism is
itself the more fundamental reason why the current suggestion fails. To see what I
have in mind, it is instructive to draw out the analogy with the solidity case. Notice
that, even after physics changed our theoretical understanding of solidity, our use of
the term ‘solid’ in everyday contexts did not change: we describe ice cubes, bricks, and
chairs as solid just as we did before. To explain this continuity, one might appeal to
reconceptualization: the objects we previously judged to be solid on the basis of the
plenum conception we now judge to be solid on the basis of a revised microphysical
conception.
But, while this is indeed a paradigmatic case of reconceptualization, it is implausible
to suppose that this reconceptualization explains the continuity of our solidity judg-
29I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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ments. This explanation is implausible because it entails that our everyday solidity
judgments are much more “theory-driven” than they actually are. We do not judge that
chairs are solid because we judge them to have a certain microphysical structure. Nor
did we (prior to learning physics) judge that chairs are solid because we judged them to
contain a plenum. On the contrary: both before and after learning physics, we judge
the chair to be solid simply because it looks solid, feels solid, and acts solid. Indeed, in
typical everyday contexts, we are completely indifferent to what exactly the chair is like
on the microscopic level: such thoughts almost never cross our minds. The point is that,
even though solidity has undergone reconceptualization, this reconceptualization does
not explain why we make the solidity judgments we do. This is because our theoretical
conception of solidity is not “operating” in typical everday contexts: it has no effect on
how we make judgments about solidity.30
One might disagree with some detail or other of how I have discussed the solidity
case. Regardless, this discussion at least helps illustrate the fundamental problem with
the present reconceptualization suggestion. Just as we are indifferent (in typical every-
day contexts) to the underlying microphysical nature of solidity, so too scientists are
indifferent (in typical scientific contexts) to the underlying metaphysical nature of laws
(see 3.4). But then, just as the change in our theoretical beliefs about solidity does
not explain the continuity of our solidity judgments, so too any (potential) change in
scientists’ theoretical beliefs about the metaphysics of laws does not genuinely explain
the continuity of scientific practice post-Oracle.
(This discussion of scientists’ indifference (in everyday scientific work) to the de-
bate over Humeanism raises a question: why can’t the non-Humean appeal to scientists’
indifference itself to explain the thought experiments? In fact, I think that this expla-
nation is basically correct. But as I discuss below, this explanation actually supports
Humeanism.)
30Could it be operating tacitly? No: even little children who do not yet have the idea of a “microscopic
level” can apply the term solid, and they apply it just like we do.
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4.3 Rejection of the Oracle’s testimony
According to a third response, the reason scientific practice does not change is be-
cause, ultimately, scientists would come to reject the Oracle’s testimony. One might
think: scientists cannot reasonably engage in their projects while simultaneously em-
bracing the Oracle’s proclamations.
While interesting, this proposal also faces shortcomings. First: I have assumed
throughout that the Oracle provides (near-enough) conclusive evidence E (see 3.1). For
example, we can suppose that the Oracle has made millions of correct predictions about
surprising matters in the past. Given the extraordinary strength of this evidence, it
would be epistemically irrational for scientists to reject E.31 So on the current proposal,
we would have to say that scientists are epistemically irrational.
In addition, this response is not fully general. While we can imagine some scientists
who decide to reject the Oracle’s testimony before returning to scientific work, we can
imagine other scientists who simply forget or stop caring about E upon their return. We
can also imagine scientists who never found the Oracle’s testimony troubling to begin
with. Just as in 4.2, scientist’s typical indifference to questions about what might or
might not be “behind the scenes” governing the Humean mosaic (see 3.4) makes this
very easy to imagine.
4.4 Summary
With Premise 1, the non-Humean faces a challenge. If scientists track non-Humean
laws, we would expect scientific practice to change dramatically after the Oracle’s tes-
timony. But according to Premise 1, it would not. In this section, I have considered
three ways the non-Humean might explain this result in a way that is consistent with
31The non-Humean might reply that, at least in Humean world (see 3.2), it would not be irrational
for scientists to reject E because it would be extraordinarily unlikely for observed empirical regularities
to obtain without something over and above the mosaic governing it. But this latter claim is at least as
controversial as the thesis of non-Humeanism itself. And it hardly seems rational to accept a controversial
philosophical thesis over a source of testimony that has made millions of (correct) surprising predictions.
And regardless, this response is not applicable to the fragile world (see 3.3).
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non-Humeanism. But none of these responses are convincing.
So, instead, we ought to take Premise 1 at face value. The reason why scientific
practice would not change after the Oracle’s testimony is because scientific practice does
not track non-Humean laws:
Premise 2: If scientists would not alter those aspects of scientific practice
relating to laws upon receiving E, then non-Humean laws do not fill the roles
that laws have in scientific practice.
Together with premise 1, premise 2 implies:
Conclusion: non-Humean laws do not fill the roles that laws have in scien-
tific practice.
One central observation throughout the above discussion is that, in the course of their
everyday work, scientists do not care about whatever might or might not be behind the
scenes governing the Humean mosaic (see 3.4). This is why scientific practice would
continue much as before even after receiving the Oracle’s testimony. But if this is right,
why think that scientific practice tracks non-Humean laws? It is only plausible that it
would do so if scientists cared about facts about what is “over and above” the Humean
base in the course of everyday scientific work. But they don’t: in scientific contexts,
scientists make judgments about laws in complete indifference to such facts.
4.5 Final objections
I’ll now consider some final objections.
Objection 1 : The argument is circular. It is only when we assume that
scientists accept the claim P ≡ ‘Humean laws can perform various types
of work in scientific practice’ that we are able to predict that post-Oracle
scientific practice would not change.
Response: To show that the argument is not circular, I will consider the three specific
arguments from 3.4 for why scientific practice would remain unchanged. Argument
(II) appealed only to facts about human psychology. As for (I), the argument from
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indifference: this argument is actually in tension with P . The point with (I) is that
scientists, when doing their everyday work, are not thinking about Humean vs. non-
Humean laws at all. (But wouldn’t scientists have to at least tacitly accept P for scientific
practice to remain unchanged? No—scientists do not require theoretical beliefs about
Humean laws to go about their everyday work anymore than a child requires theoretical
beliefs about ethics in order to do the right thing.)
As for (III), it requires the claims that: (i) if scientists track non-Humean laws, the
Oracle’s testimony would adversely affect scientific projects and (ii) scientists’ projects
would not be adversely affected by the Oracle’s testimony (because, after all, the scenar-
ios are exact Do¨ppelgangers of the actual world). Neither of these claims presupposes
anything like P . (Again, scientists do not require any theoretical beliefs about the
metaphysical nature of laws when deciding whether to continue scientific practice.)
Objection 2 : Suppose we grant that scientific practice aligns with Humean
laws. No matter. Even if we drop the term ‘law’ entirely, we can still ask:
are there non-Humean necessary connections in nature? And this question—
the question of real metaphysical importance—has nothing to do with how
scientists use laws. Indeed, we might introduce a new term ‘law*’ that is
stipulated to refer to non-Humean necessary connections and then debate
whether there are laws*.
Response: This response is structurally analogous to the “Ontologese gambit” familiar
from the metaontology literature, where the ontologist introduces a “metaphysically-
privileged” quantifier in order to resist deflationary pressures from ordinary language.
While I think the laws* gambit deserves further attention, it is outside the scope of
this paper to consider it further. I will only observe that the debate over HS may look
different after this gambit. For example, traditional arguments for non-Humeanism (or
Humeanism) may no longer seem persuasive.
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5 Deflecting arguments against Humean laws
The Oracle argument is an objection to non-Humean laws. But the argument may
have a further role in the debate over HS. To conclude the paper, I will discuss how
the argument may also help deflect certain common objections to Humean laws. (Note,
however, that the main argument of this paper does not require the success of the
Humean responses considered in this section; see 3.6 for discussion).
To motivate the objections, consider a case discussed by Roberts (2008, 357): a
world with Newtonian laws where nothing exists except for a single particle traveling
at a constant velocity. Prima facie, it seems that Humeans must deny that the single
particle world is nomically possible (given Newtonian laws); after all, the Humean mosaic
in this world is too impoverished to ground Newtonian laws.
This denial raises two problems. First: scientists treat cases like this as genuinely
nomically possible (consider, e.g., a physics problem set concerning systems involving a
single particle or just a few particles). Second: there are worries about nested counter-
factuals (e.g., “had there been nothing but a lone particle, then had there been more
particles than one, the force between any two particles would have accorded with New-
ton’s law of gravity”32). It seems that the Humean cannot account for how laws are held
fixed when scientists evaluate such counterfactuals (see 2.1 for discussion).
In addition, the above case serves as part of an alleged counterexample to HS. It
seems possible for the laws of nature to be Newtonian except that f = ma is replaced
by f = ma2. Given these modified laws, it is again nomically possible for nothing to
exist except for a single particle traveling at a constant velocity. So, when comparing
this world with the previous one, we have two worlds with the same Humean base but
with different laws.
To respond to these objections, Roberts (2008, 357-361) provides a contextualist
semantics for law statements. According to Roberts, the truth of law statements depends
32See Lange (2009, 54) for this kind of example.
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on which scientific theory is contextually salient. For example, when asked to consider a
single-particle world with Newtonian laws, one enters a context where Newton’s theory
is salient. In such a context, the statement ‘f = ma is a law’ is true. But when asked to
consider a single-particle world with modified Newtonian laws, the salient theory changes
and the statement ‘f = ma2 is a law’ is true. So on this account, there is a single possible
world considered from two perspectives. By distinguishing these contexts, the Humean
can respond to this alleged counterexample.
This contextualist treatment also allows the Humean to address the worries about
nomic possibility and nested counterfactuals. In the “Newtonian” single particle world,
one assesses nomic possibility and one evaluates counterfactuals from the perspective
of the salient Newtonian theory. This allows for the Humean to align with scientists’
treatment of these issues.
The success of these responses depends on the plausibility of a contextualist semantics
for law statements. To motivate this view, Roberts (2008, 96-105) offers the following
thought experiment. Let M be some value of mass that is greater than the total mass
of all the matter in the universe. Assume that both of the following regularities obtain:
P : f = ma
P ∗: f = Φ(m)a, where Φ(m) =

m if m < M
2m−M otherwise
P and P ∗ are two possible laws that make conflicting predictions about the behavior
of bodies with mass greater than M . Now suppose that human scientists endorse the
sentence ‘P is a law’ but alien scientists endorse the sentence ‘P ∗ is a law’ (here, we can
suppose that P ∗ seems more natural to the aliens than it does to us). Roberts’ intuition
is that, in this case, both communities would be speaking correctly. He accounts for this
intuition by offering his contextualist semantics.
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In response, the non-Humean may insist that there is a fact of the matter about who
is correct about the laws. But the Oracle cases provide support for Roberts’ view that
‘P is a law’ is true as spoken by humans while ‘P ∗ is a law’ is true as spoken by the
aliens.
After talking to the aliens, we can imagine human scientists worrying: “What basis
do we have for thinking that P is a law that the aliens do not equally have for thinking
that P ∗ is a law?” But for the same reasons that scientists would not let the Oracle’s
testimony impede their projects, so too scientists would not let their conversations with
the aliens impede their projects. Insofar as scientists would still be able to successfully
pursue their projects, they would continue to do so in the optimal way (and would not
let the fact that the aliens make different judgments about the laws adversely affect their
projects). If the aliens are relevantly similar to us, then analogous remarks will apply to
them as well.
So we have two communities that agree on all relevant evidence, and neither is moved
to change their practice even after dialogue with the other. The best explanation for
this situation is that the term ‘law’ is context-sensitive in the way Roberts describes.33
As mentioned above, this provides the Humean with an attractive response to worries
about nomic possibility, nested counterfactuals, and alleged counterexamples to HS.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented a new argument for Humean Supervenience. I con-
sidered (epistemically) possible situations in which scientists receive conclusive evidence
that we live in a Humean Do¨ppelganger. In other words, they receive evidence that—
according to the non-Humean—falsifies our law judgments, but which—according to the
Humean—does not falsify our law judgments. I argue that, in these possible scenarios,
all law-related aspects of scientific practice relating would remain unchanged. In other
33Alternatively, we might say that humans and aliens employ slightly different law concepts.
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words, scientists would treat the regularities “preferred” by the Humean as the laws.
On this basis, I concluded that non-Humean laws fail to align with scientific practice.
In addition, I discussed how this argument can defuse certain prominent objections to
Humean laws.
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